TOP SECRET

21 July 1949

MINORANDOM

TOt

OPP

FROK:

PG-1

SUBJECT: Drafts of Recommended memoranda for Mr. Joyce and Col. Teaton on possible SEA crossings of PIXIR border.

- 1. Attached are drafts of a memorandum to Mr. Jeyse and Gol. Yeaton, following up on the action covered in the cable to Athens on possible GRA crossings of Pixie border. The memoranda are for Mr. Wisner's signature.
- 2. It recommends that strong pressure be brought to bear on Greek Government and Army to prevent possible future crossings on a large scale.

CHOP

BECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT BATE 2007

DOWN GRADE PER EJCATION FEBRUARY CLASTIFICATION FEMILEW DIVISION

31210

MEMORAHDUM FOR: ROBERT P. JOYCE, POLICY PLANNING STAFF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: Danger of GHA continuing pursuit of guerrillas

across Albanian berder

1. As you have been informally advised, we have been informed from ______ that there is a rapidly mounting feeling in the Greek General Staff that when the Greek Matienalist Army successfully advances to the Albanian border, the Army should continue its pursuit of the guerrillas acress the Albanian frontier in order to capture and annihilate them.

- 2. Such action on a large scale would be very unfortunate from the point of view of the Albanian plan. The invasion of Albanian territory by the U.S.-supported Greek Army would ebviously tend to rally some popular support for the Hexha regime, particularly in view of the Albanians' long standing fears concerning Greek claims in the "Northern Epirus." Such military action would also lend credence and support to both Seviet and Albanian Communist propaganda themes that U.S. imperialism is threatening the "peoples' democracies" in the Balkans, particularly Albania.
- 3. The greatest danger, however, is that these border crossings might coincide with phase four of the Albanian plan. If this should happen, the two events would be linked in the public mind and the onus for both operations would be placed on the U.S. This could be used by the Kromlin as a pretext for direct military intervention into the situation.
- 4. The minor incidents which are bound to occur will not be too serious. However, we feel that pursuit across the berder must not be the policy, either official or unofficial, of the Greek Government or Army and that large scale crossings must not be allowed to occur.
- 5. For the above reasons, we recommend that whenever it is considered appropriate, strong pressure be brought to bear on the Greek Severament and Army to prevent GWA units from crossing into Albania.

FRANK G. VISNER
Assistant Director for
Policy Coordination

Dist. #1 - Joyce 2 & 3 - PG-I 4 & 5 - Reg.

JEX 3 OF COPIES TOP SECRET